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An organization will often use a specialized technical language that is un-
derstood by its members but not by others. We develop a theory of optimal
organizational languages and identify a key trade-o⁄ between facilitating
internal communication and encouraging communication with other organi-
zations. ￿Dialects￿are suboptimal: two organizations will either share the
same language or develop two entirely distinct set of technical words. This
endogenous discontinuity in communication structure results in a disconti-
nuity in ￿rm structure, and a limit on ￿rm scope. A broader scope allows for
more synergies to be captured, but at the cost of less precise communication
within each unit. Our theory reconciles two recent phenomena within orga-
nizations: the recent increase in information centralization and the reduction
in hierarchical centralization.1 Introduction
"We were late. Whether it be MPLS over ATM, whether it be
precedent bit over IP."
John Bloomer, Enron employee, responding in trial to questions
from Enron Task force prosecutor Ben Campbell (Houston Chron-
icle, May 11, 2005).
Agents often use technical languages to communicate with others about
contingencies that are speci￿c to their common environment. These ￿codes,￿
to use the term introduced by Arrow (1974), economize in communication
costs, as they allow for information to be transmitted e¢ ciently. However,
such improvements in communication come at the cost of limiting communi-
cation with agents from outside the group. In this paper, we study the trade-
o⁄s determining the adoption of speci￿c technical languages or ￿codes￿by
organizations, and how they shape in turn di⁄erent aspects of organizational
design. Since agents are boundedly rational, the need to learn specialized
codes constrains the scope of the organization: a specialized code facilitates
communication within a service or function, but limits communication be-
tween services, and thus makes coordination between them more di¢ cult.
The essential trade-o⁄ determining the scope of the language chosen is thus
one between specialization and coordination. An organization that wants to
capture more synergies by expanding its scope must acquire a more vague
and imprecise common language to facilitate coordination among its units.
Coordination failures due to incompatible languages can have severe con-
sequences. Consider for example an incident in the Persian Gulf between
US military services on April 14, 1994. On that date, two US Airforce F-15
￿ghters shot down two US Army Blackhawk helicopters over the Iraq no-
￿ ight zone, killing everyone inside. Investigators found no individual guilty;
the tragedy was the result of grave organizational dysfunctions.1 In partic-
ular, communication was hindered by misunderstandings resulting from the
di⁄erent, and incompatible, codes used by the Army and the Airforce. Three
instances are particularly striking. First, the word ￿ aircraft￿was understood
by the Air Force to include helicopters, but by Army pilots to exclude he-
licopters (Snook, 2000:163). As a consequence, the Air Force pilots did not
expect any American helicopter to be present in the no-￿ y zone, while the
Army pilots did not think they were breaching the order. Furthermore, the
AWACS crew thought it was responsible for airplanes, but not helicopters
(Snook, 2000: 163). Second, the two key acronyms concerning the no-￿ y
1The account that follows is from Snook (2000).
1zones, AOR (Area of Responsibility) and TAOR (Tactical Area of Respon-
sibility) were understood di⁄erently by Army and Air Force: ￿ To the Army,
AOR meant the area outside northern Iraq; to the Air-Force, it meant just
the opposite￿ (Snook, 2000:157). Third, the Air Force and the Army heli-
copters interpreted di⁄erently the rules governing the electronic exchanges
used to identify other aircraft as friendly or foe (the so-called IFF system,
for ￿ Identify Friend or Foe￿ ), which led the Army helicopters to be identi￿ed
as enemies (Snook, p. 2000:157). The Air Force pilots saw US helicopters
where (they thought) they should not be, when they were not expected to
be, using a wrong frequency of IFF, and shot them down.
For a less belligerent example, consider the development of a common
language for DNA sequencing at the world￿ s foremost genomics research cen-
ter, the Broad Institute in Cambridge, MA.2 Originally the Institute was
organized along functional lines (e.g. molecular biology, production, tech-
nology development, production informatics). While communication within
each group was satisfactory, between group communication was poor: ￿ sci-
entists and engineers from di⁄erent areas could not understand each other￿ s
language.￿Yet, obtaining further process improvements required multidisci-
plinary insights. In 2002-2003, the institute decided to develop a common
language based on the language of statistical control systems, including com-
mon concepts such as process risk, Pareto categorization of risks, process
variability, design phase curve, etc. This common language allowed for a
highly successful organizational re-design around multi-disciplinary groups
for large projects. Not only did coordination between the di⁄erent groups
improve, but also managers were able to reduce the time they spent on co-
ordination, consistently with the theory we present in this paper.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. We ￿rst present a simple theory of
language and characterize the properties of optimal organizational languages.
Our theory builds on previous informal discussions by Arrow (1974) on the
use of specialized codes by organizations. We then use this theory to under-
stand the constraints on ￿rm scope and structure imposed by the need for
specialized languages, and to derive testable empirical implications.
Section 2 studies a simple model of codes. We begin by studying commu-
nication between on agent who receives a stream of heterogeneous problems
(e.g., customers with certain needs) and must communicate this information
to someone else in the organization who holds specialized knowledge (e.g.a
production engineer). As the two agents are boundedly rational, they can
only learn a limited number of words to describe the characteristics of the
2Personal interview of one of the authors with Robert Nicol, director, Sequencing
Operations, Broad Institute.
2problems they face. Hence, the problem-solving capability of an organization
depends on the code it uses. Following Arrow, we make a key assumption:
the organization is able to determine the code its members adopt.3
We characterize the properties of e¢ cient codes. E¢ cient codes use pre-
cise words for frequent events and vague words for more unusual ones. A
more unequal distribution of events increases the value of the creation of a
specialized code, since the precision of the words can be more tightly linked
to the characteristics of the environment.
After studying the optimal code when two agents are communicating, we
turn to the situation where two agents receive problems and must communi-
cate them to one agent. We show that bounded rationality imposes sharply
decreasing returns to the diversity of codes: groups of homogeneously skilled
agents will use either entirely separate codes or common codes: ￿dialects,￿
as we show, cannot be optimal. This code commonality is a key determinant
of the decreasing returns to scope in organizations. Thus, it shapes both the
scope of organizations and their use of integrating mechanisms.
In Section 3 we study the implications of our theory of language for
the organization of ￿rms. First, our theory highlights the trade-o⁄ between
improving local e¢ ciency and generating synergies. Broadening the scope of
a ￿rm is justi￿ed since it can exploit some synergy. However, ￿rms cannot
capture the synergy and leave everything else the same. Capturing it requires
some coordination and communication between services, which requires in
turn that they speak a common language. Since a common language cannot
be well-suited to the needs of diverse specialized individual services, the scope
of the ￿rm is limited. Bounded rationality thus results in a theory of ￿rm
boundaries. We identify the variables that determine the terms of this trade-
o⁄. A broader ￿rm, which must use a common code, is more likely when
the degree of synergy among services is high, when the cost of imprecise
communication is low, and when the types of problems faced by the services
are similar ￿ in these cases the optimal codes are close and the distortion
required by the common code is small. In its study of this tradeo⁄, our
paper is a contribution to the debate on the tradeo⁄ between specialization
and coordination (Hart and Holmstrom (2002), Hart and Moore (2005)),
but from an entirely di⁄erent angle (endogenous communication).4 Second,
3The assumption that codes are the result of some optimization process (rather than
pure historical accidents) can be defended in two ways. The case studies in Section 4 show
that organizations do a⁄ect, in a deliberate way, the internal codes they use. At a more
theoretical level, Rubinstein (2000) studies optimal languages and presents a model in
which they arise as outcomes of evolutionary models. Section 5 discusses the connection
to Rubinstein￿ s work.
4Hart and Holmstrom (2002) study the trade-o⁄ betwen the synergies obtained from
3codes interact in a meaningful way with the ￿ vertical￿structure of the ￿rm,
and a⁄ect in particular the use of hierarchy. A hierarchical superior in our
model functions as a translator, who enables services with di⁄erent codes to
cooperate. Thus hierarchies provide an alternative method for coordinating
two services ￿common codes (associated with horizontal communication)
and hierarchies are substitutes.
Our analysis sheds some light on the impact of information technology-
related changes in search cost on organization. As these costs decrease, we
expect to observe horizontal integration, since the cost of common codes
decrease and capturing synergy becomes relatively more attractive. We also
expect to observe vertical disintegration in the form of ￿ delayering,￿as ￿ trans-
lators￿are less necessary and units can communicate directly with each other.
Our theory thus generates the implication that advances in information tech-
nology should result in an increase in common codes, an increase in peer-to-
peer communication and horizontal coordination, a reduction in the number
of layers of management within existing hierarchies and a broadening of ￿rm
scope. Thus our analysis provides a rationale for recent empirical ￿ndings on
IT and organizational change, which we examine in Section 4, that suggest
an increase in decentralization, together with a reduction in the number of
layers.
More importantly, the theory reconciles two recent trends observed in
organizations ￿ towards information centralization and towards hierarchi-
cal decentralization. As we argue in Section 4, although one could expect,
absent our theory, that more centrally available information would lead to
more central decisions, it appears that the opposite is true, as we docu-
ment in our case studies. Our analysis suggests that what is crucial is the
homogenization and standardization of categories across the organization,
which facilitates horizontal communication between agents and allows for
the substitution of hierarchical communication by horizontal communication
mediated by a common code. We present two examples of these changes: the
Microsoft corporation, where common human resource and ￿nance categories
were adopted throughout the organization, leading, according to the account
integration and the private bene￿ts of control obtained by managers. Hart and Moore
(2005) study the allocation of authority over the use of assets when agents with several as-
sets (coordinators) can have ideas involving the common use of several of these assets, and
when agents are motivated by their own interest rather than the organization￿ s. The key
comparative static prediction in their work concerns the consequences of synergies on in-
tegration and hierarchy. Our analysis generates similar comparative statics on integration
and on hierarchy (where hierarchy is unrelated to authority) but, because communication
between agents is possible in our work but not in theirs, also allows us to evaluate the
impact of information costs on horizontal and vertical structure.
4of Robert J. Herbold, its Chief Operating O¢ cer from 1994 to 2001, to an
increase in decentralization; and the development of the B-2 project, where
the traditional between-team vertical communication (mediated by higher up
￿ translators￿ ) was replaced by horizontal, peer-to-peer communication thanks
to a common set of categories across teams.
Our paper abstracts from incentive considerations. This useful simpli-
cation is common in organizational theory.5 However, to the best of our
knowledge, none of the previous literature has studied the relationship be-
tween the organizational code and the organizational choices of the ￿rm. In
this respect, our analysis is the ￿rst to provide a simple way to analyze an elu-
sive idea, the idea of organizational language, and to use such a formalization
to study organizational isses.6
Section 5 discusses links with other previous literature, and directions for
future research. All proofs are in Appendix A. Appendix B extends some
results presented in the body of the paper.
2 A Simple Theory of Language
In this section, we lay down a simple theory of the choice of a technical
language or code, beginning with the case of two agents who need to com-
municate with each other, in subsections 2.1 to 2.3, and turning to the case
of an agent who needs to communicate with several other agents in subsec-
tion 2.4.7
5An incomplete list includes papers on team theory (Marschak and Radner￿ s (1972),
CrØmer (1980)), information processing (Radner (1993) and others: see Van Zandt, 1999
for a survey), problem solving (Garicano, 2000), communication within organizations
(Bolton and Dewatripont (1994)), and corporate culture (CrØmer (1993), Prat (2002),
Chowdhry and Garmaise (2004)).
6Wernerfelt (2004) considers codes that minimize communication costs under common
preferences, and studies the existence of symmetric or asymmetric equilibria with one or
multiple codes; he does not consider the interaction between codes and organization. An
alternative approach, which studies endogenous communication in a strategic environment,
is taken e.g. by Battigalli and Maggi (2002) who use a sophisticated model of language
to develop a theory of contract incompleteness; and by Dewatripont and Tirole (2005)
who study the strategic interactions between the communication e⁄orts made by di⁄erent
agents.
7Information theory (Shannon, 1948), studies optimal codes. However, because the
questions posed are very di⁄erent, so is the analysis. In particular, information theory is
concerned with issues such as the representation the messages with sequences of binary
digits (bits) that are as short as possible and understanding issues such as the capacity of
di⁄erent types of channels or the determinants of decoding errors. In general, the theory
assumes that the sender must transmit all of the information, and chooses the code that
minimizes transmission cost. In our setting, which is concerned with the organizational
52.1 Model
A team composed of a salesman and an engineer serves clients. The clients
approach the salesman with a problem that demands a solution x, drawn
with probability fx > 0 from a ￿nite set X.8 The salesman can classify
problems, but not perfectly, since he is boundedly rational. The engineer
and the salesman therefore agree, before the salesman meets the client, on
a code ￿a shared technical language that allows the salesman to transmit
(coarsely) the class to which he has assigned the client￿ s problem. Formally,
a code C is a partition fW1;W2;:::;WKg of the set X. By uttering the word
k, the salesman lets the engineer know that the problem x belongs to the
subset Wk. We call the breadth of word k the number nk ￿ ]Wk of events
that it contains, and its frequency, pk ￿
P
x2Wk fx.
The bounded rationality of the agents is represented by the maximum
number of words, K, that they can learn.
Having received word k from the salesman, the engineer must still identify
the precise problem x of the client in order to solve it. This diagnosis stage
takes time and/or energy, and its cost is a strictly increasing function d of the
breadth nk of word k ￿ the less precise the word, the more work diagnosis





which we will simply write D(C) when there is no risk of ambiguity.9
We shall assume that serving clients is su¢ ciently valuable relative to
the diagnosis cost that the engineer would never want to exclude solving
problems with certain values of x. Thus the pro￿t-maximizing code is the
code that minimizes the expected diagnosis cost.
The following simple example makes our de￿nition of diagnosis cost more
concrete. The two agents are medical doctors: the ￿ salesman￿is a general
implications of agents￿bounded rationality, the transmission cost is given, but the sender
is prevented from transmitting all the information.
8Nothing fundamental in our analysis requires a ￿nite set, but many technicalities are
avoided by this assumption. Similarly, to avoid unnecesary technilaties, we assume that
fx > 0 for all events x.
9Linear diagnosis costs are a special case, and we use them because they provide a
tractable technique to study the organizational consequences of codes. Moreover, some
models of diagnosis do yield linear costs, such as when all objects must be searched for
example to be compared. In any case, if search costs are low compared to the bene￿ts of
a better ￿t, searching through the entire set of objets would be (close to) optimal and the
analysis of the text carries through.
6practitioner and the ￿ engineer￿is a specialist. The problem consists in diag-
nosing a patient who presents a number of symptoms. The general practi-
tioner sees the patient ￿rst, may run a battery of tests, and then prepares a
referral for the specialist. The referral describes, using the specialized ￿ code￿ ,
the knowledge that the generalist has gained about the patient￿ s problem.
To the extent that the code is imprecise, due to the agents￿bounded ratio-
nality, the specialist will spend more time and e⁄ort diagnosing the patient￿ s
problem. Such cost is a diagnosis cost (literally in this case ￿but it also
corresponds to our de￿nition). The more imprecise the referral, the higher
the diagnosis cost.10
Throughout this section, the frequency fx is exogenous. In reality, the
frequency of events is in￿ uenced by the organizational design ￿ we explore
this link in Section 3.
2.2 Optimal codes
In this subsection, we derive some properties of the optimal code for these
two agents (remember that all proofs are in the appendix).
Proposition 1. In an optimal code, broader words describe less frequent
events: if nk > nk0, then fx ￿ fx0 for any x 2 Wk and x0 2 Wk0.
Proposition 1 implies that in an optimal code events of similar frequencies
are grouped together: if fx < fx0 < fx00 and x and x00 belong to the same
word, then x0 also belongs to that word. Intuitively, agents use more precise
words for those events they confront more often.
Proposition 1 relates word breadth to event frequency. The next result,
Proposition 2, relates word breadth to word frequency; it requires the addi-
tional assumption that the function d is (weakly) convex.
Proposition 2. If the function d is ￿convex￿in the number of events n, i.e.,
if
d(n + 1) ￿ d(n) ￿ d(n
0 + 1) ￿ d(n
0) for all n ￿ n
0 ￿ 1;
then, unless integer constraints make it impossible, in an optimal code broader
words are used less frequently: if nk ￿ nk0 ￿ 2, then pk0 ￿ pk.
10A recent experimental literature, following Weber and Camerer (2003) aims to un-
derstand the way individuals create codes and the constraints such codes pose on orga-
nizational success. In these experiments, individuals must create words to communicate
quickly which picture they are looking at. Through repetition, they develop conventions
that allow them to improve communication. The paradigm is di⁄erent from ours, in that
individuals can describe each event perfectly, but they aim to describe it fast. These ex-
periments allow Munyan and Camerer (2005) to study mergers and ￿nd that the merged
groups eventually reach the performance of the non-merged groups.
7The intuition for the result can be easily seen by assuming nk ￿ nk0 + 2
and pk > pk0, and considering the special case where there exists an event
~ x 2 Wk0 such that pk ￿ p~ x > pk0 + p~ x. Then, transferring ~ x from Wk to Wk0
decreases the diagnosis cost of the most probable word, Wk, at least as much
as it increases the cost of the less probable word, Wk0, which is impossible if
the code is optimal.
We have assumed that events could be allocated between words arbitrar-
ily. In some instances, however, the ￿meaning￿of events imposes constraints
on the languages which can be constructed. For example, if we are partition-
ing the color spectrum into discrete color words, words will group contiguous
points of the spectrum. In Appendix B we extend Propositions 1 and 2 to
environments where events have a natural ordering: we show that for two
contiguous words, the broader word is used less often and describes events
with a lower average frequency.
2.3 Environment Complexity
Agents face environments with varying degrees of complexity, and this a⁄ects
the value of the codes that they use. We identify here complexity with the
variability of the environment ￿a more complex environment is a less pre-
dictable one, where a wider range of problems is likely to be confronted. We
illustrate this fact with a simple example. Suppose there are three possible
events fx1;x2;x3g and that Pr[x3] = p and Pr[x1] = Pr[x2] = 1
2 (1 ￿ p),
with p > 1=3. If the agents can use at most two words, the optimal language
consists of a word for fx1;x2g and a word for fx3g. The expected diagnosis
cost is p + 2(1 ￿ p) = 2 ￿ p. Diagnosis cost is decreasing in the probability
of the most likely event, p. As we shall see, this is a general property. The
diagnosis cost always goes down when we move from a more complex envi-
ronment (one where it is hard to predict what event will occur) to a simpler
one.
Consider two distributions of the same set of events, f and ~ f. Use the
￿rst distribution, f, to rank events according to their probability of occurring,
namely, f1 ￿ f2 ￿ ::: ￿ fm. Let Fi denote the probability that the event has
index i or lower given distribution f. Similarly, let ~ Fi denote the probability
that the event has index i or lower given distribution ~ f (but recall that we
are still using the indexing derived using f). We then say:11
De￿nition 1. The distribution f represents a more complex environment
than ~ f if Fi ￿ ~ Fi for all events i.
11Our notion of environment simplicity is analogous in spirit to ￿rst-order stochastic
dominance in that it induces a partial ordering of distribution functions.
8An environment becomes simpler if unlikely events become even less likely
and likely events become even more likely. In the three-event example above,
for any ~ p > p > 1=3, the distribution with p represents a more complex
environment than the distribution with ~ p.
We can show that the diagnosis cost is increasing in complexity:
Proposition 3. If f represents a more complex environment than ~ f, the
minimal diagnosis cost associated with f is (weakly) larger than the minimal
diagnosis cost associated with ~ f, that is minC D(C;f) ￿ minC D(C; ~ f ):
In a simple environment, there are a few extremely likely events and
a large number of rare events. Communication costs are low, because the
optimal code assigns likely events to narrow words, and narrow words are very
probable. The worst-case scenario occurs when all events are equiprobable:
words will divide the event space into equiprobable sets, and this will impose
a high diagnosis cost.
When the number of words is equal either to 1 or to the number of events,
diagnosis costs are the same whatever the complexity of the environment.
Together with proposition 3, this implies an interesting interaction between
the bene￿t of additional words and the complexity of the environment.
Proposition 4. Increasing the number of words from 1 to K > 1 lowers di-
agnosis costs more for less complex environments. On the other hand, mov-
ing from K words to a very large number of words (perfect communication)
lowers diagnosis more for more complex environments.
Having a code with more words is always useful, but its relative bene-
￿t depends on both the complexity of the environment and the richness of
the language. Starting from the coarsest language, adding words is most
bene￿cial in simple environments. The savings in terms of diagnosis cost
are high because few words can describe precisely a large proportion of the
events. If instead the code is already rich, the additional cost reduction is
greater for complex environments. As a consequence, if words are expensive,
we should observe basic codes for simple environments but no code at all for
complex ones. With lower cost of words, the code will stay basic in simple
environments, but could jump from non-existing to rich in complex ones.
2.4 Shared codes and dialects
We study now the choice of code when agents facing di⁄erent distributions of
events must communicate with one another. Speci￿cally, we study the choice
9of code by an engineer who needs to communicate with two12 salesmen, A
and B; who face the same set of events X but di⁄erent distributions fA
x
and fB
x . We shall show that, in the stark model which we are analyzing,
￿dialects￿are never optimal. Each period, salesman A receives requests from
mA clients, and salesman B requests from mB clients.
Each of the three agents can learn at most K words. Agent A uses code
CA, agent B uses code CB, and the engineer, who must understand both
agents, must know code CA [CB (of course, he only uses the relevant part of
this code when communicating with either salesman).
For instance, with X = f1;2;3;4;5;6g, we could have
CA = ff1;4g;f2;5g;f3;6gg; (2)
CB = ff1;2;3g;f4;5;6gg: (3)
Then, the engineer must know ￿ve words, while A knows 3 and B knows 2.
Proposition 5 shows that the same code, which saturates the rational-
ity constraints of all the agents, will be used in communicating with both
salesmen.
Proposition 5. The optimal codes contain K words and satisfy CA = CB.
The proof of proposition 5 can be found in the appendix, but we present
two examples which illustrate it. First, with K = 5, consider the codes of
equations (2) and (3). The narrowest noncommon words13 are f1;4g, f2;5g,
and f3;6g; let us introduce f1;4g into CB. Then, ~ CB = ff1;4g;f2;3g;f5;6gg;
every event is now represented by a shorter word, and diagnosis cost must
go down while the engineer must still learn ￿ve words, f1;4g, f2;3g, f5;6g,
f2;5g and f3;6g. Notice that CA and ~ CB are still not e¢ cient: if we add
f2;5g to ~ CB, we obtain the code composed of (f1;4g, f2;5g, f3g, f6g and
f3;6gg). This code satis￿es the bounded rationality of the agents, and its
use by all will lead to lower diagnosis cost than CA and CB.
A more complicated example starts from
CA = ff1;2;3g;f4;5;6g;f7;8;9;10g;f11;12;13;14;15;16gg;
CB = ff1;4;7;11g;f2;5;8;12g;f3;6;9;13g;f10;14;15;16gg:
If we take f1;2;3g as the narrowest non-common word, we obtain
~ CB = ff1;2;3g;f4;7;11g;f5;8;12g;f6;9;13g;f10;14;15;16gg:
12It should be clear that the assumption that there are two agents is made only for ease
of exposition and is totally unnecessary for the results.
13We are taking some liberty with our terminology. Strictly speaking, we have de￿ned
a word to be the name of a set of events. In this discussion, a word is the set of events
itself. This should create no confusion, and lighten considerably the exposition.
10All events but 10, 14, 15 and 16 are now represented by strictly shorter
words and no event is represented by a longer word. It is more e¢ cient for
the engineer to use the code CA and ~ CB than the initial codes CA and CB.
Iterating the elimination of the narrowest non-common word, we converge
to a common code for both agents which is more e¢ cient than both of the
original codes.
We have shown that the engineer will use the same code to speak to both
salesmen. Which code will be chosen? It will be the code which would have
been chosen had the engineer faced only one salesman with a distribution
of events equal to the expected distribution of events for the two salesmen.
This is formalized in the following corollary.








Of course, in reality, we would expect the engineer (and more generally
hierarchical superiors) to know more words than salesmen, for two reasons.
First, if bounded rationality imposed a ￿nite cost on the acquisition of lan-
guage rather than an absolute limit on the number of words that can be
learned, it would be optimal for the engineer to learn more words than the
salesmen. Second, if some agents have di⁄erent abilities, it would be optimal
to select for the role of engineer the agent who is able to learn the greatest
number of words. Presumably, it would be optimal for the salesmen to share
some words, while using speci￿c words to communicate to the engineer events
that they encounter much more often than the other salesman. On the other
hand, a more realistic model would allow for communication between the two
salesmen, which would reinforce the bene￿ts of a common language. Gari-
cano and Rossi-Hansberg (2005) build a theory of hierarchies where agents
who have the ability to complete more tasks are chosen as ￿supervisors￿ ;
it may be possible to build similar theories, where the supervisors are able
to learn more words. We take a small step in that direction in Section 3.3,
where we assume that the ￿rm can hire, at an additional cost, an agent with
a larger K.
Thus while our result that there are no dialects, i.e., that the language
used for all communications is exactly the same, is ￿too strong,￿we believe
that it draws attention to a general phenomenon of great economic signi￿-
cance: namely, the steeply decreasing returns to dialect variety. Suppose that
an agent develops di⁄erent specialized words to talk with di⁄erent subsets
of agents. Since the union of the words in all of these dialects must satisfy
each agent￿ s bounded rationality constraint, each dialect can only contain a
11limited vocabulary. If the agent instead uses a general common code to talk
to all other agents, he can have a less tailored, but richer set of words that
he can use in his communication with each of the other agents. The common
language forces agents to give up on tailoring words to speci￿c needs, but
relaxes the constraints imposed by bounded rationality. Alternatively, agents
may choose fully separate languages where they can enjoy the advantage of
tailoring each word to their speci￿c needs without giving up on bounded
rationality.
3 Language and Organization
In the previous section, we studied the optimal code for exogenously given
organizations. In this section, we optimize jointly on organizational struc-
ture and code. Given an environment, what are the optimal communication
structure and code? And what is the organizational structure that supports
them?
We develop a simple model with two services. We compare three pos-
sible organizational forms: separation, where the two services use di⁄erent
codes; integration where the two services share the same code; translation
or hierarchy where there exists a hierarchical structure supplying an inter-
face between the services. The three forms are presented schematically in
Figure 1 and described next. We study communication and coordination in
these three forms, and we identify the environments in which each of them
is optimal.
3.1 The costs and bene￿ts of collaboration
Services A and B are each composed of one salesman and one engineer. They
generate revenue, normalized to 1, whenever an engineer correctly diagnoses
the problem faced by the client of a salesman. A fraction of clients ￿A from
the overall client population arrive at service A; and a fraction ￿B arrive at
service B; with ￿A+￿B = 1: We call fA and fB the problem distributions over
these subpopulations, and f the distribution over the entire client population,
that is f = ￿AfA + ￿BfB. We call the quadruple (fA;fB;￿A;￿B) a client
distribution.
Collaboration is bene￿cial because there exist some synergies between the
services. In particular, if the two services A and B do not collaborate with
each other (Panel A in Figure 1) they can deal with a number qNC (NC stands
for ￿No Communication￿ ) of clients on average: service A can process ￿AqNC
while B can process ￿BqNCclients. If instead the two services can cooperate
12Engineer A Engineer B
Salesman A Salesman B
Engineer A Engineer B
Salesman A Salesman B
Translator
Salesman A
Engineer A Enginner B
Salesman B
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Figure 1: Communication in three possible organizational forms. The dashed
lines represent lines of communication.
by serving some of each other￿ s clients (which requires communication, see
Panel B in Figure 1), they can serve a higher number qC of clients, qC > qNC:
￿AqC are clients of salesman A and ￿BqC of salesman B. However, these
clients will be served in part by the other engineer: for instance, ￿￿AqC
clients of salesman A will be served by engineer A while (1￿￿)￿AqC will be
served by engineer B. The following example provides a very simple situation
that falls under these general assumptions.
Example 1. Assume that an engineer has the ability to
attend to the needs of at most one client per period, and that the
number of clients who contact a salesman in each period is
0 with probability p,
1 with probability (1 ￿ 2p),
2 with probability p,
where p 2 [0;1=2]. Then
q
NC = 2((1 ￿ 2p) + p) = 2(1 ￿ p):
If they collaborate, the ￿rm can divert business from an over-
burdened service to an unemployed one. When one salesman
13receives zero clients and the other one receives two, which hap-
pens with probability 2p2, the client is served by the engineer of




1 ￿ p + p
2￿
;
with the clients served by the other engineer are determined by:
￿ =
1 ￿ p
1 ￿ p + p2:
The aggregate pro￿ts of the two services are given by the value of the
clients serviced minus the per client diagnosis cost. We let ￿D￿(f) be the
output cost of diagnosis associated with a distribution of events f when the





where ￿, the ￿ diagnosis cost￿parameter expresses diagnosis cost in output
units.14











When services do collaborate, salesmen need to be able to communicate
customer needs to both engineers. The proof of Proposition 5 can easily be
adapted to show that the two services must use the same code, and the proof
of Corollary 1 can be adapted to prove that the optimal common language
is C￿(￿AfA +￿BfB), the language which would be optimal with one engineer
14We assume throughout that it is pro￿table to use a salesman, so that the engineer
does not bene￿t from dealing with clients that have not been ￿rst dealt with by a salesman.
If information did not transit through a salesman, the engineer would have diagnose the
problem on an interval of size 1, at cost ￿NX, where NX is the number of events in X;






so that it is pro￿table to use a salesman. Similarly, as shown in 2.3, the diagnosis cost is
highest when the distribution of types is the uniform distribution funif; therefore, qNC[1￿






14receiving messages from one salesman for which the distribution of charac-
teristics is the distribution of characteristics of the client population. Thus









In what follows, we will want to study the determinants of organizational
form by analyzing how the di⁄erence between integration and separation (￿I
-￿S) depends on the environment. One important determinant of the cost of
a merger is the di⁄erence between the pre-merger optimal codes and the post-
merger common code; this in turn depends on how similar the distributions
of problems in the two distributions of clients are. We de￿ne the homogeneity
of the two client distributions formally next.15
De￿nition 2. Given a client population f, the client distribution among
services ( ~ fA; ~ fB;~ ￿A;~ ￿B) is more homogeneous than the client distribution
(fA;fB;￿A;￿B) if the distribution over the entire population f is the same
under both and the distributions of types ~ fA and ~ fB are convex combinations
of fA and fB.16
3.2 Integration or Separation?
In this subsection, we study the choice between integrated and separated
services focusing on the comparative statics of that choice. Intuitively, it is
clear that the key loss due to collaboration results from the deterioration in
within-service communication when a less specialized language is used. We
show this next.
The fundamental result on which our analysis rests is the concavity of
the diagnosis cost.
Lemma 1. For any two distributions fA and fB and any ￿ 2 [0;1], we have
D
￿(￿fA + (1 ￿ ￿)fB) ￿ ￿D
￿(fA) + (1 ￿ ￿)D
￿(fB):
A consequence of Lemma 1 is that it is easier for an organization to treat
di⁄erent client populations separately by developing a separate specialized
15There is no immediate connection between the notion of heterogeneity of a client
distribution and the notion of environment complexity used earlier. In particular, the fact
that ( ~ fA; ~ fB;~ ￿A;~ ￿B) is less heterogenous than (fA;fB;￿A;￿B) does not imply that ~ fA
is more complex than fA or that ~ fB is more complex than fB.
16For an algebraic expression of the conditions in this de￿nition, see equations (A.2)
and (A.3) in appendix A.
15code for each one of them.17 This result is critical for the comparison between
separate and integrated organizations. Inspecting (4) and (5) , it is clear that
while synergies make integration pro￿table, qC > qNC; a merger results in a
deterioration in communication within both units, as (recall ￿B = 1 ￿ ￿A) :
(1 ￿ ￿D￿(￿AfA + ￿BfB)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(D￿(fA) + ￿BD￿(fB))). Thus, depending
on the values of the parameters, the pro￿t under integration can be greater
than, equal to, or smaller than the pro￿t under separation. The following
proposition describes the comparative statics characterizing the choice of
organizational form.
Proposition 6. An integrated form becomes relatively more pro￿table com-
pared to the segregated form as a) the diagnosis cost ￿ decreases, b) the
synergy between the two services, measured by qC=qNC, increases, or c) the
homogeneity of the two client distributions increases.
Parts a) and b) are easily proven by examination of (4) and (5); they are
also very intuitive. If the diagnosis cost parameter increases, it becomes more
costly to rely on the imprecise language associated with an integrated form,
and the organization may prefer to forgo the bene￿ts of synergy in order
to save on diagnosis. Similarly, if synergies are high, an integrated form
allows for larger increases in pro￿tability. Part c (homogeneity), although
less straightforward to prove, is also intuitive. The separate codes in more
homogeneous populations are not particularly well adapted to each individual
population, and thus achieve relatively high diagnosis costs. This implies a
lower loss in the case of merger.
Note that we measure synergy by the ratio of number of customers served
when the services are cooperating to the number when they are not. This
formulation is agnostic as to whether an increase in synergy is due to a
generally positive event (qC
1 > qC and qNC
1 > qNC), a generally negative event
(qC
1 < qC and qNC
1 < qNC), or one that is positive only for communicating
services. A higher level of synergy between services will clearly make it more
pro￿table to have the two services communicate.










17The proof of Lemma 1 is unchanged if the cost of using a word were to depend on the
speci￿c events in the word and not only on their number ￿ for instance, the word f1;2g
could be cheaper to use that the world f1;4g as 1 and 2 are closer than 1 and 4. Since
the lemma is the basis for all the results that follow, the fact that the lemma still holds
in a such a more general model means these results would still be valid under this more
general hypothesis.
16an increase in p, which is generally a negative event, does lead to
an increase in synergy.
3.3 Hierarchy
We consider now organizational structures that allow the two services to
use di⁄erent codes, but exploit the synergy by employing a ￿fth agent who
provides translation (see Panel C in Figure 1) and is hired at cost ￿. That
is, rather than having all agents use the same code to allow for horizontal
(between services) collaboration, the translator steps in when inter-service
communication is needed.18 If salesman A has a problem to transmit to
engineer B, he communicates to the translator the type of the problem in
the code used in service A. The translator will search for x, and then he will
transmit the information to engineer B in the code used in service B.
Although the mode of transmission of information is di⁄erent in the hier-
archical and in the integrated form, the mode of collaboration is the same -
clients can be reallocated through the intervention of the translator. As a con-
sequence, engineer A will serve ￿A￿qC clients of salesman A and ￿B(1￿￿)qC
clients of salesman B. Hence, the language that the translator will use to
speak to him will be the language appropriate for the distribution
￿A￿
￿A￿ + ￿B(1 ￿ ￿)
fA +
￿B(1 ￿ ￿)
￿A￿ + ￿B(1 ￿ ￿)
fB:







(￿A￿ + ￿B(1 ￿ ￿))D
￿
￿
￿A￿fA + ￿B(1 ￿ ￿)fB
￿A￿ + ￿B(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
+ (￿A(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿B￿)D
￿
￿
￿A(1 ￿ ￿)fA + ￿B￿fB
￿A(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿B￿
￿￿￿
￿ ￿: (6)
Obviously, the distribution of clients in a hierarchical organization is less
homogeneous, in the sense of de￿nition 2, than the distribution in the in-
tegrated organization, and more homogeneous than the distribution in the
separated organization. Therefore, the diagnosis cost is intermediate between
the average diagnosis cost in these two other organizations.
18We assume that the translator has no direct diagnosis cost (his ￿ = 0). We obtain
the same qualitative results if we assume that the the translator faces a direct diagnosis
cost which is lower than the other agents￿cost. The assumption that the translator has a
lower cost is natural, given that he specializes in communication.
17We can now generalize and extend the result in proposition 6 to the
comparison between the three organizational forms. We assume that the
separated form does not dominate the integrated form for all values of ￿.19
Proposition 7. There exists ￿￿ > 0 such that, for all ￿ 2 (0;￿￿), there
exists ￿
IH(￿) and ￿
HS(￿) such that the unique optimal organization is
integrated if ￿ < ￿
IH(￿),







separated if ￿ > ￿
HS(￿).
The function ￿
IH is decreasing, while ￿
HS is increasing.
Translation induces a ￿xed cost ￿ and increased diagnosis costs, but
makes inter-service communication possible and thus allows the services to
pro￿t from the existing synergies. Since translation allows the two services
to use e¢ cient service-speci￿c codes rather than a common code, it will be
preferred to integration when well adjusted codes are more important, that
is when ￿ is large. However, if the diagnosis cost ￿ is too high, then the syn-
ergy gains do not compensate the increased communication costs, and the
optimal structure is the separated form. Figure 2 illustrates these e⁄ects (see
Example 1, below for the description of the underlying model in the example
of this ￿gure).
Example 1. (cont). The externality is as above, and half
of the clients arrive at each salesman￿ s. For both services we
have X = f1;:::;Ng, with fA
x = (3N ￿2+4x)=(5N2) and fB
x =
(7N+2￿4x)=(5N2). This implies that fA
x is increasing in x while
fB
x is decreasing. Because (fA
x + fB
x )=2 = 1 the aggregate client
distribution is uniform. The agents can use only two words, and
one can show that when N becomes large, when the services are
separate, for each of them the approximately 55% events with the
smallest probability are allocated in one word, while the others
are allocated to the other word. Figure 2 shows the optimal
organizational forms when N is very large.
Intuitively, Proposition 7 implies that the two modes of between service
coordination in our model, a common code and hierarchy, are substitutes.
An organization may attempt to capture synergies in two ways: either by
19For a low ￿, it may be the case that ￿
HS(￿) = ￿max. However, for ￿ close to ￿￿, it
must be that case that ￿
HS(￿) < ￿max and ￿
IH(￿) > ￿min. See the proof in the appendix
for the de￿nition of ￿￿:
18Figure 2: The choice between separation with or without a hierarchy for
example 1, as a function of the cost of communication ￿ and of the synergy
parameter p.
having a manager who translates the needs of one service for the other; or
through a common language that allows the members of the two services to
communicate with each other. A common language will be preferred when
either the costs of imprecise communication are low, or when synergies are
su¢ ciently high.
4 IT Revolution, Technical Languages, and
Organizational Change
In this section, we use our model to interpret systematic evidence that infor-
mation in organizations is becoming increasingly centralized while decision-
making becomes more decentralized. Such changes are paradoxical from
an agency perspective, since increasing information centralization should go
hand in hand with centralization of decision rights. Agency costs are toler-
ated in order to rely on agents local knowledge to make decisions; if infor-
mation is centralized, then agency con￿ icts can be reduced at low cost by
centralizing decision making. Our theory, through the substitution of hierar-
chy by common codes shown in Proposition 7, makes the opposite prediction.
We then breathe life into the link between theory and evidence by looking at
19two important cases: the re-organization of Microsoft and the adoption of a
common code for the construction of the B-2 Bomber.20
Theory Implications: Diagnosis Costs Comparative Statics. In the
past two decades, rapid advances in information technology have caused a
dramatic drop in a range of information costs, including the cost of communi-
cating it, of accessing it when it is contained in databases, and of processing
it. For the purpose of our analysis, a key feature of these changes is that by
reducing the cost of searching information, these advances reduce the cost of
receiving an imprecise message from a third party, as the receiver can con-
duct the follow up diagnosis of the problem more cheaply. If, for example,
a generalist describes the illness of a patient in general terms such as: ￿I
believe the patient has a pulmonary illness that was discussed in a recent
issue of JAMA￿the specialist can actually ￿gure out what he must mean
speci￿cally with a quick key word search of the relevant database (Medline).
Our theory predicts that these changes should imply an increase in in-
tegration in the form of links across and within ￿rms, through the use of
hierarchies and common codes; moreover, within already integrated units,
decreases in diagnosis costs reduce the translation role of hierarchy, by fa-
cilitating horizontal communication ￿ we should witness the substitution of
common codes for hierarchies and increase in peer-to-peer communication.
As we have argued in the introduction, these predictions are speci￿c to our
model, since it is the ￿rst in the literature that allows communication for
both horizontal (between similar agents) and vertical agents. Both of these
broad predictions appear consistent with the evidence.21
Systematic Evidence. First, the reduction in information costs is corre-
lated with increasing code commonality. Historically, the information gener-
ated by each business unit within a ￿rm and by each function within each
business unit has been coded and processed separately, according to the needs
of that business unit or function; the di⁄erent pieces of information were often
de￿ned in di⁄erent ways and could not be easily aggregated.22 As information
20A separate empirical literature documents the impact of di⁄erent natural (rather
than technical) languages on trade. It ￿nds that a common language has an important
positive impact on trade between countries. See Melitz (2005) for evidence and references
to previous work.
21Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) which studies the organization of knowledge
acquisition and earnings inequality, show how ￿ delayering￿can also result from a decrease
in the cost of accessing knowledge, which leads to an increase in the knowledge available
to each individual, and thus limits his reliance on the hierarchy for problem solving.
22For example the database company Oracle had 70 incompatible databases for its
human-resources department. This made it impossible to answer simple queries, such as
20costs have dropped, companies have sought ways to integrate this disperse
information. In particular, this integration was obtained, between and within
￿rms, through tools such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems23
and, earlier, Electronic Data Exchanges (EDI)24. These programs allow for
the exchange of electronic data by standardizing its format. Through these
systems, ￿rms have substituted ￿ exible ways to code their data by more rigid
but uni￿ed central databases.25 These common information systems have re-
sulted in increasing horizontal information links within and between ￿rms,
as the examples below show.26
Second, the reduction in information costs induces greater decentraliza-
tion. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) were the ￿rst to ￿nd evidence of this
complementarity between IT and decentralization. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson
and Hitt (2002) ￿nd, using ￿rm-level data, that greater use of information
technology is associated with broader job responsibilities for line workers,
and more decentralized decision-making. Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) also
￿nd, on entirely di⁄erent data, evidence that the degree of decentralization of
authority is complementary with the use of IT. Rajan and Wulf (2003), in a
panel study of the hierarchical structure of ￿rms, ￿nd that the span of control
of the CEO is increasing over time, in particular, through the disappearance
of the role of the COO. With more employees under his direct authority, the
CEO can exert less control: decision making is more decentralized.
Thus, the evidence does suggest that the drop in information costs led
to (1) increasing commonality of codes in organizations and (2) increasing
decentralization at the expense of hierarchy. This is not su¢ cient to show
that these changes are causally linked in the way that our model describes.
We use some case-study evidence to illuminate this connection.
how many employees were working at any time at the company. ￿If anyone wanted to ￿nd
out the exact number of Oracle employees, it would take weeks of searching￿ and by the
time the answer was found, it would already be out of date.￿(￿Timely Technology,￿ The
Economist, January 31, 2002.)
23See for instance the products o⁄ered by SAP http://sap.com or Baan
http://www.baan.com.
24We refer to EDI systems broadly, to include other related approaches such as CPFR
(￿Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment￿ ) which involves deeper and
more extensive electronic information sharing and has been installed, for example, by
Nabisco and used with Webmans￿Food markets (￿Enterprise System,￿Financial Times,
February 22, 1999); or web-based integrated value chains, such as the one introduced by
Safeway in the UK (￿You￿ ll Never Walk Alone,￿The Economist, June 24, 1999).
25In the words of a ￿ noted American e-commerce expert￿ cited by The Economist,
ERP systems have replaced ￿fragmented unit silos with more integrated, but nonetheless
restrictive enterprise silos￿ (￿Timely Technology,￿The Economist, January 31st, 2002).
26As we will discuss in the conclusions, more work is needed on whether the horizontal
scope of organizations has been increased by IT.
21Microsoft. Robert J. Herbold,27 Chief Operating O¢ cer of Microsoft at
the time, explains that in 1994 Microsoft had a completely decentralized set
of information systems (Herbold (2000)). Each business unit used a di⁄erent
mapping of data to categories: in the terminology of this paper, they all used
di⁄erent, speci￿c, codes. For example, the ￿nancial managers of the di⁄erent
units had chosen their own categories in their ￿nancial reports, adapted to
their own circumstances. In Herbold￿ s words:
￿Some would develop ￿nancial information systems tailored
to their particular needs. Others would analyze their ￿nancial
performance in a way meant to re￿ ect the environment of their
country of operation. There was nothing seditious about this.￿
The German country manager provides another example:
￿We put years into the development of our own information
systems because those systems uniquely capture the nuances of
the German Business. Those nuances are important.￿ 28
Similarly, there was no way to have a coherent overall image of human
resources throughout the ￿rm, with eighteen HR-related databases all using
di⁄erent ways to categorize the data.
￿When asked about head counts, managers answers usually
were, to put it charitably, poetic.￿
The tailoring of the information to the speci￿c needs of the di⁄erent busi-
ness units compromised communications between them, as di⁄erent measures
needed to be reconciled.
Taking advantage of the drop in information costs, Microsoft introduced
￿ common codes￿in these two areas; now, according to Herbold, all managers
could easily make sense of the information produced by any business unit,
and thus make quick decisions. Paradoxically, and as our model predicts,
this centralizing move provided ￿bene￿ts usually associated with decentral-
ization￿as managers had easy access to relevant information and could use
it directly in their exchanges with one another.
27We rely on Herbold personal account, in his Harvard Business Review article. All
the quotes below are from his account.
28Obviously, these complaints only show that the center thought the codes were ine¢ -
ciently di⁄erent while the country managers thought that the codes were just appropriately
adapted to their di⁄erent environments. On the other hand, the center presumably cares
both about coordination between countries and the pro￿ts within each country, whereas
the country managers care mostly about local conditions. There is therefore at least some
presumption that the center￿ s objective function is better aligned with the interests of the
￿rm as a whole.
22The B-2 Bomber. The adoption of a common code for the design of
the B-2 bomber by four independent ￿rms provides further evidence on the
relationship between technology, code adoption and decentralization. The
development of the B-2 bomber began in 1981.29 Advances in information
technology made it possible for Northrop, Boeing, Vaught (a division of LTV)
and General Electric, the four companies in charge of the design, to create
a common set of categories and a central database to facilitate the design of
the bomber. A key element of the construction of a common database was
the ￿ B-2 Product De￿nition System￿ , essentially a common code, a ￿techni-
cal ￿ grammar￿by which engineers and others conveyed information to each
other.￿ 30 The development of the B-2 was the ￿￿rst major aerospace pro-
gram to rely on a single engineering database to coordinate the activities of
the major subcontractors on a large-scale design and development project￿
(Argyres, 1999:163). The use of this database had two consequences. First,
designers from di⁄erent companies could participate jointly in the design ￿
the existence of a common code allowed integration of several teams where be-
fore there was none possible, an e⁄ect illuminated by section 3.2. Moreover,
this integration reduced hierarchical coordination, since among the main con-
sequences of the creation of a relatively rigid unifying code was an increase
in decentralized decision making: ￿the technical grammar de￿ned by the B-2
systems established a social convention which limited the need for a sin-
gle hierarchical authority.￿ (Argyres 1999: 173). This is consistent with our
description of the substitution of hierarchies by codes in 3.3.
5 Conclusions
By formalizing Arrow￿ s idea of coding, we have proven a number of novel
theoretical results, concerning the structure of optimal language, the subop-
timality of dialects, and the relationship between language complexity and
environment complexity. We have also explored the relationship between
the choice of organizational language and the choice of organizational struc-
ture. This has led to testable implications on how changes in processing costs
29The account that follows draws on a detailed cased study by Ar-
gyres (1999). For background information on the B-2 and links to other
sources of information, see the site of the Federation of American Scientists:
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber/b-2.htm.
30￿This grammar was established through a highly-developed and highly standardized
data formation and modeling procedures of the system, which laid down well-de￿ned rules
for communicating complex information inherent in the part design￿(Argyres, 1999:171).
These rules included tight de￿nition of 14 part families and ￿agreed upon modeling rules
for de￿ning lines, arcs, surfaces etc.￿(Argyres 1999:169).
23and other technological characteristics determine the choice between an inte-
grated structure, a hierarchical structure, and a separated structure. These
￿ndings throw some light on the impact of recent drops in IT on organization
and information centralization.
Our work is related to Rubinstein￿ s (2000) work on the economics of lan-
guage. In sections 1.3 and 1.4 of his boook, he proposes a model of optimal
languages, although in a very di⁄erent framework (see also Econometrica pa-
per). A language is a binary relationship between ￿events￿(in our language)
and the optimal language allows for an e¢ cient precise identi￿cation of spe-
ci￿c events. Rubinstein also studies the emergence of languages through
evolution (chapter 2); his analysis provides some justi￿cation for focusing
on e¢ cient languages, as we do, as he shows that they are selected in the
evolutionary model that he considers. Of course, although we do share Ru-
binstein￿ s view that the study of optimal languages is important and fruitful,
our main aim in this paper is di⁄erent, as we are mostly interested in the
interplay between language and organization.
Our analysis suggests several interesting avenues for new research. First,
our model yields testable hypotheses. The availability of large databases of
business texts and their ease of access may allow for a study of the deter-
minants of the commonality of the language used across di⁄erent services of
di⁄erent ￿rms or across di⁄erent ￿rms in an industry. Such research would
also allow for a direct test of our hypothesis on the substitution of codes for
hierarchies: one should observe more ￿ de-layering￿(less hierarchy) and more
horizontal communication as codes become more common.
Second, our analysis can be used to provide some structure to the concept
of ￿ hard￿and ￿ soft￿information, which is increasingly used in the contracting
literature (see Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Stein, 2002). These concepts can
be given a precise meaning in our model. A word within a code is hard
information; it can easily be passed down the chain of command or in space.
The exact meaning of the word, the exact event within it that is referred to,
is soft information: it is not too costly to ￿gure out this meaning in one to
one communication, but it is very costly to do so along a chain of command
or across a long distance.
Third, it would be interesting to explore code adoption in a dynamic
setting. We conjecture that there exists a U-shaped relationship between
the persistence of the environment in which the organization operates and
the persistence of the code that the organization uses. Codes are stable over
time if the environment is either very immobile (a specialized code needs not
be modi￿ed) or it is highly unpredictable (a constant non-specialized code is
the best solution).
A fourth interesting extension would study how the analysis changes when
24individuals choose codes independently and act strategically. A previous
version of this paper, available from the authors, studies such choices. Our
analysis identi￿es a ￿rst mover advantage: a shared code is suboptimally
skewed towards the needs of early adopters; it also shows that there can
exist too little code commonality, as, for each group of users, investing in a
common code generates positive externalities towards other users. Argyres￿
study of the B-52 bomber provides some illustration of this phenomenon, as
the code which was ￿nally adopted was very similar to the code already used
by Northrop.
Finally, it would be useful to analyze the interaction between organiza-
tional codes and labor market dynamics. A worker who learns an organi-
zational code acquires organization-speci￿c human capital. How portable
is such capital between organizations? In turn, how does portability a⁄ect
equilibrium wages and job turnover? Finally, how does the optimal code pol-
icy change once the organization realizes that the code it adopts a⁄ects the
career prospects of its employees and, therefore, its hiring success? Anecdo-
tal evidence suggests that organizations choose very di⁄erent policies. Some,
like Andersen Consulting, strive for uniqueness, while others, like university
departments and research centers put a large premium on code portability
(to publish, one must communicate with the rest of the profession,not just
with direct colleagues).
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28Appendix A
Proofs of propositions in the text
Proposition 1. In an optimal code, broader words describe less frequent
events: if nk > nk0, then fx ￿ fx0 for any x 2 Wk and x0 2 Wk0.
Proof. Let k and k0 be two words such that nk > nk0 in an optimal code C.
From C, construct a new code ~ C by moving event x from word k to word
k0 and event x0 from word k0 to word k. We must have




= d(nk)pk + d(nk0)pk0
￿ d(nk)(pk + fx0 ￿ fx) ￿ d(nk0)(pk0 + fx ￿ fx0)
= (d(nk) ￿ d(nk0))(fx ￿ fx0);
which proves the result.
Proposition 2. If the function d is ￿convex￿ , i.e., if
d(n + 1) ￿ d(n) ￿ d(n
0 + 1) ￿ d(n
0) for all n ￿ n
0 ￿ 1; (A.1)
then, unless integer constraints make it impossible, in an optimal code broader
words are used less frequently: if nk ￿ nk0 ￿ 2, then pk0 ￿ pk.
Proof. Let k and k0 be two words such that nk￿nk0 ￿ 2 in an optimal code C.







= d(nk)pk + d(nk0)pk0 ￿ d(nk ￿ 1)(pk ￿ fx)
￿ d(nk0 + 1)(pk0 + fs)
= [d(nk) ￿ d(nk￿1)]pk ￿ [d(nk0 + 1) ￿ d(nk0)]pk0
+ fx[d(nk￿1) ￿ d(nk0+1)]
￿ [d(nk) ￿ d(nk￿1)]pk ￿ [d(nk0 + 1) ￿ d(nk0)]pk0
(d is increasing)
￿ [d(nk) ￿ d(nk￿1)](pk ￿ pk0) )):




￿ 0, we must have pk ￿ pk0, which proves the
result.
29Proposition 3. If f represents a more complex environment than ~ f, the
minimal diagnosis cost associated with f is (weakly) larger than the minimal
diagnosis cost associated with ~ f, that is minC D(C;f) ￿ minC D(C; ~ f):
Proof. By Proposition 1, given distribution f, there exists an optimal lan-
guage which groups events into words only if they are adjacent according to
indexing i. The optimal K-word language can be written as (i0;:::;iK): the
word k comprises all events with index between ik￿1 + 1 and ik (with the











By Proposition 1, it must be that d(ik ￿ ik￿1) is nonincreasing in k. By
re-arranging terms and noticing that Fi0 = 0 and FiK = 1, we can re-write






Fik (d(ik ￿ ik￿1) ￿ d(ik+1 ￿ ik)) + d(iK ￿ iK￿1)
But then we have
min
C


















where the ￿rst inequality is due to the fact that the optimal language for f
may not be optimal for ~ f and the second inequality is due to the fact that f
is more complex than ~ f and that d(ik ￿ ik￿1) ￿ d(ik+1 ￿ ik) is nonnegative
for every k.
Proposition 4. Increasing the number of words from 1 to K > 1 lowers com-
munication costs more for less complex environments. On the other hand,
moving from K words to a very large number of words (perfect communica-
tion) lowers communication more for more complex environments.
30Proof. This proposition follows straightforwardly from Proposition 3.
Proposition 5. The optimal codes contain K words and satisfy CA = CB.
Proof. Clearly, an optimal code saturates the bounded rationality of the
engineer, with CA [ CB containing K words. We must still prove CA = CB.
Suppose that CA 6= CB, which implies that both CA and CB contain at
most K ￿1 words. We call kmin be the narrowest noncommon word of these
two codes,31 and, without loss of generality, assume that it belongs to CA.
Transform CB into ~ CB by adding kmin as follows: k 2 ~ CB if and only
if k = kmin or W = W 0=(W 0 \ Wk) for some W 0 2 CB. Because #~ CB =
#CB + 1 ￿ K, the bounded rationality of agent B is still satis￿ed, and
because #(CA [ ~ CB) = #(CA [ CB), the bounded rationality of the engineer
is also satis￿ed
For every event x 2 X, the length of the word in ~ CB that contains x is
not larger than the length of the word in CB that contains x. Moreover, as
~ CB contains one more word than CB, at least one event must be in a strictly
narrower word in ~ CB than it was in CB. The new codes are strictly more
e¢ cient than the original ones, which proves the result.
Lemma 1. For any two distributions fA and fB and any ￿ 2 [0;1], we have
D
￿(￿fA + (1 ￿ ￿)fB) ￿ ￿D
￿(fA) + (1 ￿ ￿)D
￿(fB):
Proof. Let us call C￿(f) the optimal code associated with distribution of
events f, we have
D
￿(￿fA + (1 ￿ ￿)fB) = min
C
D(￿fA + (1 ￿ ￿)fB;C)
= D(￿fA + (1 ￿ ￿)fB;C￿(￿fA + (1 ￿ ￿)fB))
= ￿D(fA;C
￿(￿fA + (1 ￿ ￿)fB))
+ (1 ￿ ￿)D(fB;C
￿(￿fA + (1 ￿ ￿fB))
￿ ￿D
￿(fA) + (1 ￿ ￿)D
￿(fB):
Proposition 6. An integrated form becomes relatively more pro￿table com-
pared to the segregated form when either a) the diagnosis cost ￿ decreases, b)
the synergy qC=qNC between the two services increases, or c) the heterogeneity
of the two client distributions decreases.
31That is k 2 argmin~ k n~ k subject to W~ k 2 C1 [C2 and W~ k = 2 C1 \ C2.
31Proof. To prove this result, we use ￿rst the result in Lemma 1 to compare
the e⁄ects of merging two di⁄erent client populations. When homogeneity
increases, there is less di⁄erence between the optimal common code and the
two optimal specialized codes. The additional diagnosis cost associated with
an integrated structure is smaller and having a joint code becomes more
pro￿table.
We then require the following intermediate result:
Lemma A.1. If the client distribution ( ~ fA; ~ fB;~ ￿A;~ ￿B) is more homogeneous
than (fA;fB;￿A;￿B), then ~ ￿AD￿( ~ fA) + ~ ￿BD￿( ~ fB) ￿ ￿AD￿(fA) + ￿BD￿(fB).
Consequently, the loss that results from a joint code is smaller in the more
homogeneous client distribution.
(Note that in both cases, the code of the integrated service has diagnosis
cost D￿(f); thus the second statement follows directly from the ￿rst. )
Proof. By de￿nition 2, we have (note that we suppress, as in the text x from
the notation fx for simplicity)
~ ￿A ~ fA + ~ ￿B ~ fB = ￿AfA + ￿BfB for all x; (A.2)
and
~ fA = ￿AfA + (1 ￿ ￿A)fB for some ￿A 2 (0;1) and all x,
~ fB = (1 ￿ ￿B)fA + ￿BfB for some ￿B 2 (0;1) and all x.
(A.3)
Substituting (A.3) in (A.2), we obtain, for all x,
(~ ￿A￿A + ~ ￿B(1 ￿ ￿B))fA + (~ ￿A(1 ￿ ￿A) + ~ ￿B￿B)fB = ￿AfA + ￿BfB
Because fA 6= fB, this implies
~ ￿A￿A + ~ ￿B(1 ￿ ￿B) = ￿A;
~ ￿A(1 ￿ ￿A) + ~ ￿B￿B = ￿B:
We have
~ ￿AD
￿( ~ fA) + ~ ￿BD
￿( ~ fB) ￿ ~ ￿A[￿AD
￿(f + A) + (1 ￿ ￿A)D
￿(fB)]
+ ~ ￿B[(1 ￿ ￿B)D
￿(fA) + ￿B)D
￿(fB)]









which proves the result.
32This result almost immediately yields (c) in the proposition. The other




qC(1 ￿ ￿D￿(￿AfA + ￿BfB))
qNC(1 ￿ ￿(￿AD￿(fA) + ￿BD￿(fB)))
:
Then, part a) of the proposition is an easy consequence of lemma 1, and
part b) is obvious by examination.
As the client distribution becomes less heterogenous the pro￿ts under in-
tegration stay constant by (A.2) whereas the pro￿ts under separation increase
by lemma A.1. This proves part c).
Proposition 7. For all ￿ 2 (0;￿￿), there exists ￿
IH(￿) and ￿
HS(￿) such
that the unique optimal organization is
integrated if ￿ < ￿
IH(￿),







separated if ￿ > ￿
HS(￿).
The function ￿
IH is decreasing, while ￿
HS is increasing.
Proof. Let us call DI, DS, and DH the values of D￿ corresponding to the





Writing explicitly the dependance of pro￿ts on the parameters ￿ and ￿, the



















The pro￿ts under the integrated and the separated organizations are equal
for ￿ = ￿
IS, where ￿





Equation (A.4) and qC > qNC imply 0 < ￿
IS < 1=DI. Equation (A.4) also

























Because the slope of ￿H considered as a function of ￿ is intermediate between









qC (DI ￿ DH)
:
34Appendix B
Extension of propositions 1 and 2
to the ￿ Natural Ordering￿case
Suppose that there is a continuum of events with X = [0;1]. The fre-
quency of events is described by a continuous and di⁄erentiable, but possibly
non-monotonic, probability density f on [0;1]. Words are constrained to
be intervals. Writing t0 = 0 and tK = 1 a code is therefore a partition32
f[tk￿1;tk]gk=1;K.





(F(tk) ￿ F(tk￿1))(tk ￿ tk￿1)
subject to
tk￿1 ￿ tk for k = 1;:::;K.
As in the text, the familiarity of a word, [tk;tk+1];is the probability
F[tk+1] ￿ F[tk] that the word is used; its breadth, tk+1 ￿ tk, is the ￿ num-
ber of events￿in the word. Finally, the average frequency￿of the events in





Then the following proposition contains the results equivalent to propo-
sitions 1 and 2 for the case where events are naturally ordered.
Proposition B.1 (Natural order). When words must contain contiguous
events, the following two properties hold in an optimal code:
1. For two contiguous words, the broader word is used less often .
2. For two contiguous words, the broader word describes events which have
a lower average frequency.
We begin by proving the following lemma.
Lemma B.1. In the optimal code tk￿1 < tk for all k = 1;:::;K.
32As the text is written, tk belongs to two words. To avoid this, words should be
described by semi-open intervals, at the cost of heavier notation. It should be obvious to
the reader that the results are not a⁄ected.
35Proof. Assume for instance that we had t0 < t1 = t2 = t < t3. Increase t2 by
a small x. The diagnosis cost increases by ￿ multiplied by
(F(t + x) ￿ F(t))x + (F(t3) ￿ F(t + x))(t3 ￿ t ￿ x):
The derivative of this expression with respect to x for x = 0 is equal to
￿f(t)(t3 ￿ t) ￿ (F(t3) ￿ F(t)) < 0;
which proves the result.
We can know prove the proposition.
Proof of proposition B.1. The ￿rst-order conditions are
F(tk) ￿ F(tk￿1) + f(tk)(tk ￿ tk￿1) = F(tk+1) ￿ F(tk) + f(tk)(tk+1 ￿ tk),
which imply
f(tk) =
[F(tk+1) ￿ F(tk)] ￿ [F(tk) ￿ F(tk￿1)]
(tk ￿ tk￿1) ￿ (tk+1 ￿ tk)
(B.1)
The numerator is the di⁄erence between the familiarities of contiguous words,
while the denominator is the opposite of the di⁄erence between their breadths.
Thus, optimality requires that the di⁄erences between breadth and familiar-
ity of contiguous words have opposite signs, as part 1 of the proposition
states.
To prove the second statement, rewrite (B.1) as
f(tk) =
￿k+1 (tk+1 ￿ tk) ￿ ￿k (tk ￿ tk￿1)
(tk ￿ tk￿1) ￿ (tk+1 ￿ tk)
Thus ￿k+1 ￿ ￿k and (tk+1 ￿ tk) ￿ (tk ￿ tk￿1) must be of opposite sign: that
is, events in the broader word have a lower average frequency.
36